SHORT NOTES OF RECENT ENGLISH CASES.

the whole they find this mode of dealing advantageous, even at the
risk of occasional litigation. It is the business of courts reasonably
so to shape their rules of evidence as to make them suitable to the
habits of mankind, and such as are not likely to exclude the actual
facts of the dealings between parties when they are to determine on
the controversies which grow out of them. It cannot be doubted in
the present case, that in fact this contract was made with the usage
understood to be a term in it; to exclude the usage is to exclude a
material term of the contract, and must lead to an unjust decision.
Of course this could be no occasion for a decision contrary to authority, but we think any one who reads the judgment of the court in
Truman vs. Loder with attention will perceive how much it was influenced by a feeling of the supposed inconvenience of receiving any
parol evidence in the case of a written contract, and as it was not
necessary to the decision of the case then before the court, we arenot bound by it now, and we did not hold ourselves bound by it in
the case of Brown vs. Byrne, where it was brought to our notice.
For the reasons we have given we are of opinion that the evidence was receivable, and that the rule to enter a nonsuit should be
discharged.
Rule discharged.
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In th'e Court of 0hazcer.
IN THE MATTER OF KELLERs, MiNoRS.

5 Ir. Oh. Rep., 328.

Guardianand Ward-Relgious Education of Ward-ntention o/
Father.
As a general rule, the wishes of a father, either expressed or implied,
as to the religious faith in which his children after his death are to be
brought up, will be followed.-See Talbot vs. Earl of Shrewsbury, 4 My.
& Cr. Re North, 11 Jur. 17. In the above-mentioned case .of Kellers,
From the London Law Magazine for May, 1857.
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minors, this rule was acted upon under rather peculiar circumstances.
The father was nominally a Roman Catholic, the mother a Protestant, and
at the time of the marriage there was no agreement as to the religion in
which the children of the 'marriage were to be educated. The children of
the marriage were, it appeared, baptized by priests of the Roinan Catholic
persuasion, and entries of their births were made by the father in a Douay
Bible. Ten of the persons who became sponsors for the children were
Protestants, and three Roman Catholics. The children never, during the
life of their father, attended Roman Catholic worship, except the eldest
son, who upon one occasion only was taken by his father to see mass performed, on an occasion of great solemnity, and by way of spectacle.- 'The
father engaged a Protestant governess for the younger children, and placed
his two eldest children, sons, at a Protestant school, where they received
'the usual elementary instruction in the Protestant religion, and with his
knowledge and sanction attended a Protestant church. The father by his
will appointed the mother testamentary guardian, who for several years
after the father's death, until the two eldest children had attained the ages
of eleven and ten, continued to bring them up in the faith of the Established
Church. The mother having ceased to act as guardian, a guardian was
appointed by the court to act in her place. It was held by the Master of
the Rolls of Ireland, that the children ought to be brought up as Protestants. His Honor after referring to in re Brown, a minor 2 Ir. Ch. Rep.,
151, and Talbot vs. the Earl of Shrewsbury, 4 ]1. & Cr., 672,-and the
principal facts of the case, made the following observations :-" No doubt
a Roman Catholic father, appointing a Roman Catholic testamentary
guardian, more distinctly indicates his wishes than a Roman Catholic
father appointing a Protestant testamentary guardian; but where the
children, as far as they could from their age be brought up in any religion,
appear to have been brought up as Protestants in the lifetime of their
.father, and with his sanction, I think the appointment of a Protestant
.guardian is, in conjunction with the other circumstances of the case, an
indicationof his wishes, which the court should attend to.
- "The mother, the testamentary guardian, states in her affidavit, that
she verily believes that, if her husband had surviyed, he would himself
.have reared all the minors Protestants. And that she also believed that,
in nominating in his will her whom he well knew to be a strict Protestant
.to be the guardian of the persons of his children, he did so in the expectation and with the object that they would be reared Protestants; and that
she believed, that if the said minors should be now educated in the Roman
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Catholic faith, upon the presumption of their deceased father's desire, it
would, in fact be contrary to his real sentiments and wishes. No doubt
there is difficulty in the case, from the fact that the children were baptized
by clergymen of the Roman Catholic Church, and their births entered in
the Douay Bible; and that of the thirteen sponsors three were Roman
Catholics and ten were Protestants. But the question which I have to
decide is, has the father of the minors indicated a wish that his children
should be brought up as Protestants? On the best consideration I can
give the case, I am of opinion that he has indicated such intention, and
that the court is bound to carry it out. It has been contended, that the
circumstances of the children having been brought up Protestantssince the
death of the father in 1850 (six years), would in itself be a reason against
having any alteration made as to the religious faith in which the minors
have been brought vp. And such argument might have weight in respect
of the two elder minors, on the authority of the case of Fallons minors not
reported, decided by the Lord Chancellor, and referred to by counsel.
"On the other hand, it has been said that the testamentary guardian
has not been in the habit of attending any place of public worship since
her husband's death, and that none of the children are of an age, having
regard to the want of religious instruction, to have formed opinions on the
subject. I do not, however, think it necessary to express an opinion on
the latter ground, and I decide the case on the ground that the weight of
evidence is in favor of an intention on the part of the father of the minors
that they should be brought up in the Protestant faith."
In a recent case, Stourton vs. Stourton, W. R. ]856-7 p. 418, the principle laid down in the above cited case, Follons minors, has been acted upon,
and it has been conclusively decided, that where a child has been for a
long time educated in a different faith from that of his deceased father, the
Court of Chancery will not interfere.

CAMPBELL vs. HooPER.

3 Sm. and Giff., 153.

Lunatic-fortgagemade by, to bona fide .Mortgagee,valid.
A person executed a mortgage, being at the time a lunatic; the mortgagee, however, who advanced the money bonafide, was not aware, at the
time he did so, of the state of the mortgagee's mind, and took no advantage of it. Sir John Stuart V. 0., held that the mortgagee was entitled
to a decree of foreclosure against the real and personal representative of
the mortgagor. "Even at law," said his Honor, "the contract of a luna-
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tic is not necessarily void. Even at law, the plaintiff in an action at law,
e'eking to recover, under the contract of a person whose lunacy is established, has been held entitled to relief. That was the case of Baxter vs.
Lord Portsmouth, 5 B. and C. 170, where the lunacy was established beyond a doubt. The court of law gave relief on the footing of the contract.
The principal has been established at law in other cases, and by the
Court of Exchequer Chamber in the case of Molton vs. Camrooux, 2 Exch.
487, which was decided after a laborious and accurate examination of all
Mr. Justice Patterson, in the case of Dane vs. Lady
the authorities.
.Kirkwall, 8 C. and P. 685, in directing the jury laid down the law thus:It is not sufficient that Lady Kirkwall was of unsound mind, but you
must be satisfied that the plaintiff knew it, and took advantage of it.' It
would be a strange thing if a court of equity, in dealing with contracts,
were to deal on a different principle. See, however, Jacob vs. Richards,
5 De G., M. and G. 55.

DEAN vs. THWAITE.

21 Beav., 621.

Mines- Working thbse of a 'eghbor-Modeof directing an AccountI
Onus probandi.
In this case the defendant had, by underground working, taken the coal
of his neighbor. It was held by Sir John Romilly, I. B., that the defendant could only be compelled to account for what he had taken six years
before the filing of the bill, see 3 and 4 Will. IV, c. 27, s. 26, but the
onus of proving what part had been taken during such six years, lay upon
the defendant, who was a wrongdoer.
"The way," said his Honor, "I intend to deal with the account is this
I shall see if the parties themselves can agree as to the amount and extent
of these workings. If they cannot, then I shall probably appoint, under
the powers intrusted to me by the Act of Parliament (which, I think extends to cases of this description,) some coal agent, who is perfectly well
acquainted with matters of this description, to examine and make report as

to the state of the works, and as to what coal has been taken from under
certain plots of land of the plaintiff, which will be specified, and to take all
proper measurements for that purpose. Suppose he finds that a certain
quantity, suppose 1,000 tons, has been taken, I shall then call on the defendant to show what portion of that coal has been taken prior to the six

years.
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"I think the burden of proof ought to rest on the defendant, for this
reason :-I assimilate this to the case, which I have frequently had occasion to refer to, of the chimney-sweep who found the diamond ring-Armory vs. Delamiric, 1 Stra. 505-and governed by the principle which I
have constantly acted upon, that the case will be taken most strongly
against a person who keeps back and destroys evidence. I apply that principle to a person whose duty it was to keep strict evidence of what workings there were in other persons' lands, and shall charge a person working
the coal mines in the adjoining land with the full amount raised, unless
he can prove it was not taken wvithin the time during which the court directs the account. On the taking of that account, I shall certainly not
treat this as a case of fraud, but shall act on any reasonable evidence I can
get to ascertain at what time the coal was worked. This is the view I
take with respect to the mode of taking the account of coal worked."

In the Courts of Common Law.
BRASS vs.
S

MAITLAND.

6 Ell. & BI., 470.

i.-Liabillty of Shippers of Goods of a Dangerous Character.

The first count of the declaration complained that plaintiffs were owners
of a general ship; that defendants caused a corrosive substance to be packed
in casks, and delivered to plaintiffs as casks of bleaching powder, to be
carried in the ship; that plaintiffs and their agents were ignorant *that
bleaching powder contained a corrosive substance, and the casks outwardly
appeared to be sufficient. But that the casks were insufficient, and the
contents so improperly packed, that the corrosive contents escaped and
destroyed the cargo.
The second count complained that defendants shipped a dangerous article,
knowing it to be such, without notice of its danger; and the plaintiffs,
without knowledge of its dangerous nature, received it, and stowed it in
the hold, where it did mischief. The defendant pleaded inter alia to so
much of the first count as relates to the insufficiency of the packages: that
defendants purchased the goods ready packed from third persons named,
and were not themselves, or by their servants, guilty of negligence.
Fourthly, to first count: that the persons employed on the ship knew, and
had the means of judging, of the sufficiency of the casks. Ten.thly, to the
second count: that the master of the ship knew, or had the means of
knowing, the dangerous nature of the goods. On demurrer to these pleas,
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it was held in the Co'urt of Queen's Bench, by Lord Campbell, C. J., and
Wightman, J., that there is an implied undertaking on the part of shippers
of goods on board of a general ship, that they will not deliver, to be carried
on the voyage, packages of a dangerous nature, which those employed on
behalf of the ship-owner may not, on inspection, be reasonably expected
to know to be of a dangerous nature, without giving notice. That, consequently, both counts were good, and the third plea bad.
But that the fourth and tenth pleas, which they construed to amount to
an allegation of facts equivalent to notice, were good. It was held by
Crompton, J., that the implied undertaking of the shipper did not extend
beyond an obligation to take proper care not to deliver dangerous goods
without notice : and that on the first count and third plea, taken together,
the defendants appeared to be innocent shippers of goods, dangerous in
fact, but without any negligence on their part; and that, therefore, the
defendants should have judgment on the third plea. He agreed with the
rest of the court, that the fourth plea was good, and the second count
good; but he construed the tenth plea as not amounting to an allegation
of notice, and therefore held it bad.

RENTER VS. ELEcTRIc TELEGRAPH

Co.

6 Eli. & Bl.,

341.

Coiporation- Obligation of Parol Contracts on Tradirg Corporation.

The defendants were incorporated by royal charter for trading purposes.
By the deed of settlement, the directors were to manage the business of
the company; but all contracts above a certain value were to be signed by
at least three individual directors, or sealed with the seal of the company,
under the authority of a special meeting.
Plaintiff sued the company on an agreement above the prescribed value.
It-was within the scope of the company's business, and was made by parol
with the chairman, who, with his own hand, entered a memorandum of it
in the minute-book of the company. It was recognized in correspondence
with the secretary: plaintiff did work under it, and received payments by
checks for it. These payments passed into the accounts of the company,
and were audited and allowed; but there never was any contract signed by
three directors, or under the seal of the company.
On a case stating these facts, with power to draw inferences of fact, the
Court of Exchequer held that the contract was ratified, if not authorized
by the company, and binding.
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SNEAD vs.

WATKINS.

1 Com. Bench, N. S., 267.

laknZeeper--iZn- Goods brought by a Guest, but belonging to Third
Person.
One Hulme, who had formerly been clerk to the plaintiff, an attorney,
was subpoenaed as a witness in an action brought by the plaintiff to recover
the amount of bill of costs. Hulme put up at a public house of entertainment at Westminster, kept by the defendant, bringing with him a bag
containing, amongst other things, a letter-book belonging to the plaintiff.
Whilst at the defendant's house, Hulme became indebted to the defendant
for lodging and refreshments, and quitted without paying his bill, leaving
behind him the bag with the letter-book, which the defendant refused to
deliver up to the plaintiff on demand, claiming a lien on the bill against
Hulme.
The Court of Exchequer held that the claim of lien was valid.

DhUTTON vS. GUARDIANS OF CLUTTON UNION.

1 H. & N., 627.

Watercourse-Rightto Flow oj Waterfrom Spring Head.
The plaintiff's mill was situated on a stream partly supplied through a
natural channel from "The Red House Spring," rising in a field belonging
to Captain Scobell. The defendants, in order to obtain a supply of water for
the Union Workhouse, which was about a mile from this field, took from
Captain Scobell a grant of the use of the spring, and constructed works in
the field so as to cut off the water at its source before it came to the surface, and receive it into a deep tank for supplying the workhouse waterpipes. The stream that served the plaintiff's mill was by this means
greatly diminished in forcei and the Court of Exchequer unanimously held
that this was a wrongful act on the defendants' part, and that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover damages. Baron Martin observed, "the owners
of lands adjoining a stream have a natural right to the use of the water of it.
A river begins at its source-when it comes to the surface; and the owner
of the land on which it rises cannot monopolize all the water at the sourc,
so as to prevent it reaching the lands of other proprietors lower down."
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KINUSFOD VS. MERRY.

1

11. & N., 503.

Delivery Order-Title of Pledgeefrom Holder obtaining Possession lI
Fraudulent Representation.
This was an action of trover for three tons of tartaric acid. The plaintil, were manufacturing chemists, and in April, 1853, Jones & Co., as
brokers, sold for them two tons of the acid, to be delivered in November.
In October Gray & Co., as brokers, sold for the plaintiffs two tons more of
the acid, to be delivered also in November. Thb brokers respectively sent
to the plaintiffs sold notes, not disclosing the principal. In November the
invoices were sent to the brokers in the usual course, and soon afterwards
delivery orders for three tons of the acid were left with the plaintiffs by the
clerk of one Anderson, viz : the first signed Jones & Co., for delivery of
one ton to 31r. Thomas Broomball, and endorsed by Broomhall, "Deliver
to my order ;" the other signed by Gray & Co., for delivery of two tons to
Broowhall, endorsed by Broomhall, "Deliver to W. Leask. John Ellis."
" Deliver at Custom-house Quay to my sub-order.

W. Leask."

Leask was a broker, and Anderson induced him to purchase the acid for
him on a false representation that he was acting for Van Notten & Co., and
subsequently obtained from Leask the delivery orders, endorsed as above,
on the pretence of inspecting the acid. Anderson was never authorized to
take possession of the acid, but stated to the plaintiffs that he had purchased
the aoid of Leask, and requested them to deliver it to him. The plaintiffs,
deceived by Anderson's representations, gave him a delivery order, and the
acid was transferred into his own name, and he thus obtained warrants,
and pledged the acid with the defendant for a bona fide advance.
The Court of Exchequer Chamber held (reversing the judgment of the
Court of Exchequer) that under these circumstances the relation of vendor
and vendee did not subsist between the plaintiffs and Anderson, and that
the property in the acid did not pass to Anderson, and that mere possession, with no further indicia of title than the delivery order, was not sufficient to entitle the defendant, though a bona fide pawnee, to resist the
plaintiff's claim in an action of trover.

